سلسلة الجزر الأولى

(تم التحويل من First island chain)
محيط سلسلة الجزيرة الأولى (باللون الأحمر).

سلسلة الجزر الأولى first island chain، يشير لأول سلسلة من الأرخبيلات خارج ساحل البر القاري الشرق آسيوي. يتكون بصفة أساسية من جزر كوريل، الأرخبيل الياباني، جزر ريوكيو، تايوان، شمال الفلپين، وبورنيو؛ من شبه جزيرة كامچتاكا حتى شبه جزيرة الملايو. حسب بعض تعريفات ترتكز سلسلة الجزيرة الأولى على الحافة الشمالية لساحل الشرق الأقصى الروسي شمال جزيرة سخالين، حيث تعتبر جزيرة سخالين أول رابط في السلسلة.[1] ومع ذلك، يعتبر آخرون ألوشن هي الرابط الأولى في أقصى الشمال الشرقي بالسلسلة.[2]

The first island chain forms one of three island chain doctrines within the island chain strategy in the U.S. foreign policy.[3][4] It is considered a strategic military barrier to accessing the wider Pacific Ocean given the relative shallowness of waters to the west of the first island chain, which has important implications for submarine detection.[5]

سلاسل الجزر الأولى والثانية

Much of the first island chain is roughly situated in waters claimed by the People's Republic of China (PRC).[6] These include the South China Sea, within the disputed nine-dash line, as well as the East China Sea west of the Okinawa Trough.

أصبحت سلسلة الجزيرة الأولى ذات أهمية للعقيدة العسكرية الصينية. ترى الصين سلسلة الجزيرة الأولى كمنطقة يجب تأمينها وعزلها عن القواعد، الطائرات ومجموعات حاملات الطائرات الأمريكية، وأنها عند الدفاع عن نفسها يجب أن تطلق العنان لنفسها تكتيكياً للهجوم الاستباقي على العدو. تهدف هذه العقيدة إلى غلق البحر الأصفر، بحر الصين الجنوبي وبحر شرق الصين داخل قوس يبدأ من ألوشن في الشمال حتى بورنيو في الجنوب.[7] حسب تقارير أصدرتها مؤسسات سي إس بي إيه وراند الفكرية الأمريكية، بحلول 2020، ستكون الصين في طريقها لإيجاد وسيلة لإنجاز سياسة سلسلة الجزيرة الأولى.[8]

القيمة الاستراتيجية

الصين

للمزيد من المعلومات: نزاعات بحر الصين الجنوبي and Regional reactions to China's maritime activities in the South China Sea

PRC military strategists view the first island chain as part of a cordon sanitaire by the U.S. and its allies to encircle the country and limit its strategic depth and maritime security.[9](pp. 138-139) The first island chain is often cited as a natural barrier and perceived constraint to the PRC's access to the Pacific Ocean.[5][10] Within the first island chain, the PRC's access to the South China Sea is viewed as crucial for its navy, as the Yellow Sea and East China Sea are considered too shallow for clandestine submarine operations.[11] Control over Taiwan and its deeper eastern waters would provide the People's Liberation Army Navy's ballistic missile submarines with less detectable access to the wider Pacific where they would serve as an important component of a credible second strike capability for the PRC.[12][9](pp. 148–149)

According to a 2018 United States Department of Defense report to Congress, the People's Liberation Army's Anti-Access/Area Denial military capabilities aimed at the first island chain are its most robust.[13] The report also stated that the People's Liberation Army Navy's ability to perform missions beyond the first island chain is "modest but growing as it gains experience operating in distant waters and acquires larger and more advanced platforms."[13]

اليابان

للمزيد من المعلومات: Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan and United States Forces Japan

Around 2009 Japanese military strategist Toshi Yoshihara and Naval War College professor James R. Holmes suggested the American military could exploit the geography of the first island chain to counter the People's Liberation Army Navy build-up.[14] The Cabinet of Japan has also passed defense white papers emphasizing the threat posed by the People's Liberation Army Navy in the first island chain.[15][16][17]

In the later years of the 2010s, Japan started deploying military assets to Yonaguni and its other islands to counter China's presence along that area of the first island chain.[18][19]

Japan's strategic position in the first island chain began with US-Japan joint efforts to counter Soviet expansion. The Japan Self-Defense Forces currently plays the role of protecting US military bases and preserving military strength in East Asia. As for Japan's Territorial Protection Self-Defense Forces, which mainly rely on islands in southern Japan adjacent to the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea, Japan has military advantages in anti-submarine, air defense and sea mine technologies.[20]

In 2026, Japan and the U.S. agreed to expand joint military training across the first island chain.[21]

الردع الأمريكي للصين

في 6 مارس 2022 أفادت تقارير إعلامية بأن الولايات المتحدة ستعزز ردعها التقليدي ضد الصين، من خلال إنشاء شبكة من الصواريخ الدقيقة على طول سلسلة الجزر الأولى، وذلك كجزء من خطة لإنفاق 27.4 مليار دولار بمنطقتي المحيطين الهندي والهادئ على مدى ست سنوات مقبلة.[22]

انظر أيضاً

المصادر

  1. ^ Wiktionary: first island chain
  2. ^ GlobalSecurity.org: People's Liberation Navy - Offshore Defense
  3. ^ Vorndick, Wilson (October 22, 2018). "China's Rech Has Grown; So Should the Island Chains". Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Archived from the original on 17 November 2020. Retrieved 12 November 2020.
  4. ^ "How the Pentagon thinks about America's strategy in the Pacific". The Economist. June 15, 2023. ISSN 0013-0613. Archived from the original on 2023-06-15. Retrieved 2023-06-16.
  5. ^ أ ب Patton, James (2007). "Cold War SSN Operations: Lessons for Understanding Chinese Naval Development". China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force (in الإنجليزية). Naval Institute Press. p. 278. ISBN 978-1-61251-150-4.
  6. ^ Holmes, James R.; Yoshihara, Toshi (2012-09-10). Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan (in الإنجليزية). Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-98176-1. OCLC 811506562.
  7. ^ “Asia's balance of power: China’s military rise: There are ways to reduce the threat to stability that an emerging superpower poses”, The Economist, dated 7 April 2012.
  8. ^ “China’s military rise: The dragon’s new teeth: A rare look inside the world’s biggest military expansion”, The Economist, dated 7 April 2012.
  9. ^ أ ب Wachman, Alan M. (2007-08-01). Why Taiwan?: Geostrategic Rationales for China's Territorial Integrity. Stanford University Press. doi:10.1515/9781503626379. ISBN 978-1-5036-2637-9.
  10. ^ Yoshihara, Toshi (July 2012). "China's Vision of Its Seascape: The First Island Chain and Chinese Seapower". Asian Politics & Policy (in الإنجليزية). 4 (3): 293–314. doi:10.1111/j.1943-0787.2012.01349.x.
  11. ^ Ernst, Maximilian (2024-12-18). China's Coercion of States in the Asia-Pacific Region: Balancing and Wedge Strategies in the Context of Sino-American Competition (in الإنجليزية) (1 ed.). London: Routledge. p. 14. doi:10.4324/9781003498766. ISBN 978-1-003-49876-6.
  12. ^ Howarth, Peter (2006-04-18). China's Rising Sea Power (in الإنجليزية). Routledge. pp. 28–40. doi:10.4324/9780203029152. ISBN 978-1-134-20395-6.
  13. ^ أ ب "Annual Report to Congress: Military and security developments involving the PRC 2018" (PDF). Office of the Secretary of Defense. 16 May 2018. Archived from the original (PDF) on 6 December 2018. Retrieved 10 June 2019.
  14. ^ "U.S. rearms to nullify China's missile supremacy". Reuters. May 6, 2020. Archived from the original on 26 November 2020. Retrieved 12 November 2020.
  15. ^ Gady, Franz-Stefan (August 2, 2016). "Japan's Defense White Paper Highlights Growing Threat From China". The Diplomat. Archived from the original on 14 February 2021. Retrieved 12 November 2020.
  16. ^ "Japan and Vietnam ink first maritime patrol ship deal as South China Sea row heats up". Japan Times. August 11, 2020. Archived from the original on 14 February 2021. Retrieved 12 November 2020.
  17. ^ "2020 DEFENSE OF JAPAN" (PDF). Ministry of Defense Publications. Japanese Ministry of Defense. Archived (PDF) from the original on 12 November 2020. Retrieved 12 November 2020.
  18. ^ "Japan builds an island 'wall' to counter China's intensifying military, territorial incursions". The Washington Post. August 21, 2019. Archived from the original on 12 November 2020. Retrieved 12 November 2020.
  19. ^ "Taiwan to benefit from Japan's move to boost island defense capabilities". Taiwan News. March 18, 2019. Archived from the original on 13 November 2020. Retrieved 12 November 2020.
  20. ^ "The Future of Sino-Japanese Competition at Sea". nippon.com (in الإنجليزية). 2012-03-23. Archived from the original on 2022-07-06. Retrieved 2019-06-10.
  21. ^ Mahadzir, Dzirhan (2026-01-16). "U.S., Japan Pledge to Expand Joint Training Across First Island Chain". USNI News (in الإنجليزية الأمريكية). Retrieved 2026-01-19.
  22. ^ [https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Indo-Pacific/US-to-build-anti-China-missile-network-along-first-island-chain?s=09&fbclid=IwAR34bSl0-6jowHwYZdwttZZUju8FwMW5E5UItdf3ll-PjrNE6ss30Nn8U-8 نيكي آسيا
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